Much bioethical discussion has been devoted to the subject of human enhancement through various technological means such as genetic modification. Although many of the same technologies could be, indeed in many cases already have been, applied to non-human animals, there has been very little consideration of the concept of "animal enhancement", at least not in those specific terms. This paper addresses the notion of animal enhancement and the ethical issues surrounding it. A definition of animal enhancement is proposed that provides a framework within which to consider these issues; and it is argued that if human enhancement can be considered to be a moral obligation, so too can animal enhancement.
Produces an increase in some natural function or confers a novel function; (2) Improves some aspect of the animal for human purposes; (3) Enables greater fulfilment of the animal's own interests.
These categories will obviously overlap in some cases, although not all. An increase in some natural ability may be in an animal's interests as well as serving human purposes. Conversely, many "enhancements" that increase the animal's fitness for human purposes might be considered to be against the animal's interests-forcefeeding to produce geese with grossly enlarged livers for foie gras, for example.
In relation to the first definition, it has been argued extensively in relation to other technologies (including human enhancement) that there is no special moral quality associated with the natural, nor any moral proscription against the unnatural [1, 3, 4] . It is therefore implausible that either increasing a natural function or introducing a novel function should be morally right or wrong in itself; and such a definition of "animal enhancement" tells us nothing about enhancement as a moral object.
Yet it is easy to imagine potential consequences of these modifications that might be good or bad from the perspectives of the various beings concerned. A cow whose resistance to disease is enhanced, whether by increasing its "natural" resistance or introducing novel genes, will probably live a better, disease-free life. On the other hand, genetically engineering pigs to serve as immunocompatible organ donors for humans is obviously good for the human recipients, but might be bad for the pig if the premature ending of its life as an organ donor could be said to harm it.
If animal enhancement is not right or wrong in itself, therefore, it must be right or wrong consequentially, in relation to its effects on those sorts of entities who matter morally.
Humans (it is generally agreed) matter morally; therefore an animal enhancement that produces a benefit to humans is a good thing, at least for those humans who
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benefit. We have all benefited from agricultural enhancements and probably also from research involving "enhanced" animals. This view of the utility of animal enhancement is not to be ignored; indeed it may form a substantial part of humananimal interaction in the nearer-than-expected future [32] .
What of the enhanced animals themselves? Might they also benefit from enhancements? It has been suggested that human enhancement is something that is beneficial, in the individual's interests-"If it wasn't good for you, it wouldn't be enhancement." (see Harris, p 9) [4] . If we are to use similar principles to classify animal enhancement, it is the third of the above categories that most closely maps to this definition: an enhancement in the animal's interests, which can be said to benefit the animal.
I suggest that this is an important ethical consideration for animal enhancement: if there are moral reasons for or against animal enhancement they must derive at least in part from the moral status of animals themselves and our relationship to them.
Enhancements and animal interests
If we are to accept the idea of animal enhancement being an intervention that fulfils animals' interests as an appropriate framework for considering the ethics of animal enhancement, we must establish a number of things. The first is whether animals are proper subjects of moral consideration, whether they matter morally; for if not, their interests will have no bearing on an ethical analysis. The second is what animals' interests consist of, because if we are to say whether or not an enhancement is in an animal's interest and thus ethical, we will need an adequate account of what these interests are.
There have been extensive previous attempts to define a moral theory covering animals. Most of these involve exhaustive accounts of all possible criteria upon which moral status might be based, followed by an evaluation of each possibility against already acknowledged moral truths. Of course, the content of these "truths"
